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[*1]
William 165 LLC v Ser-Boim
2020 NY Slip Op 20109
Decided on May 13, 2020
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, New York County
Ortiz, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the printed Official
Reports.

Decided on May 13, 2020
Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County

William 165 LLC, Petitioner-Landlord,
against
DAN SER-BOIM A/K/A DAN SERO BOIN, Respondent-Tenant,
ANASTACIA KURYLO, MICHAEL KURYLO, "JOHN DOE" and
"JANE DOE" Respondents-Undertenants

L & T 52496/16

Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman, LLP
William E. Baney, Esq.
270 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10016
Attorneys for Petitioner
www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_20109.htm

1/7

5/16/2020

William 165 LLC v Ser-Boim (2020 NY Slip Op 20109)

Ween & Kozek, PLLC
Nina Oksman, Esq.
20 Jay Street, Suite 814
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Attorneys for Respondents
Frances A. Ortiz, J.
Recitation as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of the
respondents' cross motion to amend the answer and for a stay.

Papers/Numbered
Notice of Cross Motion, Affirmation, Affidavit & Memorandum of Law 1
Affirmation & Affidavit in Opposition to Cross Motion 2
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order of this Court on this motion is as
follows:
This is a holdover proceeding initially commenced in January 2016 against respondent, Dan
Serro-Boim ("Mr. Serro-Boim"). He is the rent stabilized tenant of record of the premises. The
holdover claim is based upon non-primary residence. Anastacia Kurylo ("Ms. Kurylo") and
Michael Kurylo ("Mr. Kurylo") are the respondents-undertenants in this proceeding. Ms. Kurylo
is the daughter of Mr. Serro-Boim and Mr. Kurylo is the son-in-law of Mr. Serro-Boim. The
undertenants appeared and interposed a written answer dated February 25, 2016. (Exhibit R).
The answer contained several affirmative defenses including waiver and illusory tenancy. Judge
Sabrina Kraus in a decision dated July 11, 2016 dismissed the first affirmative defense of waiver,
denied the prior owner's motion for discovery seeking production of documents, granted prior
owner's motion to depose respondents, and ordered payment of use and occupancy. (Exhibit
S). Respondents appealed the July 11, 2016 decision. The Appellate Term, First Department on
January 30, 2019 reversed Judge Kraus' dismissal of the first affirmative defense of waiver and
reinstated the defense. (Exhibit U). Specifically, the Appellate Term found:
www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_20109.htm
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Respondents-undertenants' waiver defense should not have been summarily
dismissed, since, in our view, an issue of fact is presented as to whether petitioner's
acceptance of rent from respondents over at least a seven-year period, constituted a
waiver of petitioner's right to object to respondents' continued occupancy of the
premises .In addition to paying the rent in their own names, respondents claim to have
made improvements in the apartment with the consent of petitioner, received a rent
credit from petitioner in consideration for the same, and corresponded directly with
petitioner concerning maintenance, rent and repair issues in their own names. Thus, on
this record, the issue of whether petitioner waived its right to object to respondents'
continued occupancy should be resolved at trial, and not on summary judgment

PB 165 William St. Holdings LLC v. Sero-Boim, 62 Misc 3d 144(A) (AT 1st Dep't 2019).
Thereafter, on January 31, 2019, the Appellate Division, Second Department issued Matter
of Marie Jourdain v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 159 AD3d
41 (2nd Dep't 2018), lv dismissed 34 NY3d 1009 (2019). The Appellate Division, Second
Department concluded that under RSC § 2523.5 (b) (1), "permanent vacating of the housing
accommodation by the tenant" means the time that the tenant permanently ceased physically
residing at the housing accommodation and that the mere execution of a renewal lease and the
continuation of rent payments by the tenant after the tenant permanently ceases to reside at the
housing accommodation does not extend the relevant time period.

Based on this holding in Matter of Marie Jourdain, supra., respondents-undertenants filed
a complaint with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal ("DHCR") on February 12,
[*2]2019 seeking an order directing petitioner to issue them a rent stabilized lease renewal for the
premises in Ms. Kurylo's name. (Exhibit V — the DHCR complaint).
Additionally, respondents-undertenants based on Matter of Marie Jourdain, supra., move
for leave to file and serve an amended answer in this proceeding. Now, they want to raise a
succession defense in the answer. They are also seeking a stay of this proceeding pending
DHCR's determination on their complaint. Respondents in their initial answer did not raise
succession rights as an affirmative defense because from the date that Mr. Serro-Boim vacated
the premises and moved to Florida, he refused to remove his name from the lease or to add
respondents-undertenants to the lease. It is undisputed that Mr. Serro-Boim vacated the premises
on or about 1998. (Kurylo Aff'd ¶15). Subsequently, Mr. Serro-Boim died in January 2018.
(Kozek Aff'rm ¶5, footnote 1).
www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_20109.htm
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It is likely that respondents-undertenants did not raise a succession defense in their answer
because the controlling First Department case law on permanent vacatur is that a tenant who
vacates but continues to execute renewal leases and pay rent in his or her name cannot be found
to have "permanently vacated" for purposes of 9 NYCRR §2523.5 (b) (1). Third Lenox Terrace
Assoc. v. Edwards, 91 AD3d 532 (1st Dep't 2012). Accordingly, respondents seek to amend
their answer to raise succession rights as a defense, after the holding in Matter of Marie
Jourdain, supra., since they believe their factual circumstances are similar to those in Jourdain.
(Exhibit B — proposed Amended Answer).
Under CPLR §3025 (b), leave to amend pleadings should be freely given, and denied only
if there is prejudice or surprise directly resulting from the delay or if the proposed amendment is
palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law McCaskey, Davies & Assocs , Inc v New
York City Health & Hosps Corp , 59 NY2d 755, 57 (1983); McGhee v Odell, 96 AD3d 449,
450 (1st Dep't 2012) When deciding whether to permit an amended answer, a court considers
the following factors merit to defenses, reason for delay, and prejudice to the petitioner caused
by the delay Norwood v City of New York, 203 AD2d 147 (1st Dep't 1994), lv dismissed, 84
NY2d 849 (1994) A party opposing leave to amend must overcome a heavy presumption of
validity in favor of allowing the amendment Otis El Co v 1166 Ave of Ams Condominium,
166 AD2d 307 (1st Dep't 1990) Prejudice to warrant denial of leave to amend requires some
indication that the opposing party has been hindered in the preparation of its case or has been
prevented from taking some measure in support of its position Kocourek v Booz Allen Hamilton
Inc , 85 AD3d 502, 504 (1st Dep't 2011)
Here, respondents-undertenants seek to amend their answer to include succession rights
pursuant to 9 NYCRR §2523.5 (b) (1). In the appellate courts of the First Department the only
relevant time period for establishing succession rights is the period immediately prior to the
tenant's permanent vacatur. If the tenant has not maintained the apartment as a primary residence
during that legally defined time frame, then there is no succession. A tenant who vacates but
continues to execute renewal leases and pay rent in her name cannot be found to have
"permanently vacated." Third Lenox Terrace Assoc. v. Edwards, supra. In Third Lenox the
court precluded succession rights to the sister of the tenant of record because she could not
show co-occupancy with the tenant of record during the last two years of the latest renewal lease.
Moreover, recently on February 26, 2020 the Appellate Term, First Department
acknowledged in two decisions the split in authority between the Appellate Divisions of the First
www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_20109.htm
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and Second Department regarding the interpretation of when the "permanent vacating of the
housing accommodation by the tenant" occurs pursuant to 9 NYCRR §2523.5 (b) (1). W. 48th
Holdings [*3]LLC v. Herrera, 66 Misc 3d 150(A) (AT 1st Dep't 2020) and Diagonal Realty
LLC v. Arias, 66 Misc 3d 150(A) (AT 1st Dep't 2020). In both decisions the Appellate Term,
First Department stated the identical language:
We acknowledge that there is a split in authority between the Appellate Divisions of the
First and Second Department regarding when the "permanent vacating of the housing
accommodation by the tenant" occurs (Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] §
2523.5[b][1]; compare Matter of Well Done Realty, LLC v. Epps, 177 AD3d at 428
and Third Lenox Terrace Assoc. v. Edwards, 91 AD3d at 533 with Matter of Jourdain
v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 159 AD3d 41 [2018], lv
dismissed 34 NY3d 1009 [2019]). Clearly, we are bound by the law as promulgated in
the Appellate Division, First Department, until the Court of Appeals makes a
dispositive ruling on the issue (see D'Alessandro v. Carro, 123 AD3d 1, 4 [2014]).

W. 48th Holdings LLC v. Herrera, supra. and Diagonal Realty LLC v. Arias, supra.
Applying the factual circumstances of these respondents to the above discussed First
Department appellate case law, they have not presented a meritorious defense of succession
pursuant to 9 NYCRR §2523.5 (b) (1). Norwood v City of New York, supra. Actually, their claim
for a succession defense is insufficient as a matter of law in the First Department.[FN1]
McCaskey, Davies & Assocs., Inc. v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., supra. Moreover,
the petitioner in its opposition has overcome the heavy presumption of validity in favor of
allowing the amendment. Otis El. Co. v 1166 Ave. of Ams. Condominium, supra. As such, this
Court cannot grant the cross motion to amend the answer to include a succession defense.
First, Mr. Serro-Boim, the tenant of record vacated the premises and moved to Florida in
1998 but refused to remove his name from the lease or add respondents-undertenants to the
lease. (Kurylo Aff'd ¶15). After his 1998 vacatur, he executed nine (9) renewal leases solely in his
name. (Baney Aff'rm ¶31). His last renewal lease expired on December 31, 2015. (Id.).
Therefore, the Kurylos would have to show co-occupancy with Mr. Serro-Boim, during the last
two years before December 31, 2015. However, this is not possible because Mr. Serro-Boim
vacated the premises on or about 1998. Accordingly, respondents' cross motion to amend the
answer is denied.

www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_20109.htm
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Additionally, the part of respondents' cross motion seeking to stay this proceeding pending
DHCR's determination on their complaint is denied as moot. According to Exhibit 1 to the
[*4]affirmation in opposition, the DHCR Rent Administrator in an Order dated November 12,
2019 terminated the proceeding. The Administrator found that because the parties had the instant
pending holdover petition, the issue of whether respondents are entitled to a renewal lease offer
would be addressed by this Court.
This matter is marked off calendar It may be restored by motion of either party or pursuant
to two attorney stipulation, when normal court operations resume
ORDERED that respondents' cross motion to amend the answer is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that respondents' cross motion to stay this proceeding is denied as moot.
This is the decision and order of the Court, copies of which are being emailed and mailed to
those indicated below.

Dated: New York, NY
May 13, 2020
_______________________________
Frances A. Ortiz, JHC
Footnotes
Footnote 1:After the Appellate Division, Second Department decided Matter of Marie
Jourdain, supra., this Court while sitting in the Second Department decided a motion for
summary judgment by the landlord regarding when the "permanent vacating of the housing
accommodation by the tenant" occurs under 9 NYCRR §2523.5 (b) (1). The decision analyzed
the split in authority between the Appellate Divisions of the First and Second Department on the
issue. This Court denied the landlord's request to apply the holding of Third Lennox supra. to
its case. Instead, it concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis required it as a trial court to
follow decisions and precedents established by the Appellate Division of its own department, if
the Court of Appeals has not ruled on the same precedent. Hence, it denied the landlord's motion
for summary judgment and applied the Second Department's holding in Matter of Marie

www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_20109.htm
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Jourdain to the decision. 5712 Realty LLC v. Taylor; 63 Misc 3d 922, 929 (Kings Cty, Civ. Ct.
2019).
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